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Research Paper no. 4/07 
 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON 
 THE GERMAN AND UK LIFE INSURANCE MARKETS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY 
BETWEEN 1991 – 2002 *† 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides an intra and inter-country assessment of deregulation and industry 
efficiency in the European insurance industry.  The impact of deregulation is expected 
to be magnified within an analysis of the Continental maximal regulated German 
industry and the Anglo minimal regulated UK industry.  Results suggest that while 
increased competition in the UK is reflected in higher intra-industry cost efficiency; 
an inter-industry analysis indicates that the German industry dominates UK cost 
efficiency both before and after deregulation. These results maybe explained by the 
efficiency enhancing nature of German regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1994 the Third Generation Insurance Directive deregulated the European insurance 
market.  By enabling insurance companies to operate across national boundaries and 
by removing regulations on pricing and product ranges, the process of deregulation 
was expected to spawn improvements in cost efficiency and productivity growth.   
The process of deregulation was expected to make a greater impact on markets and 
firms which previously operated in highly regulated environments.  For example, in 
contrast to the pre-existing deregulated UK market; Germany with a high degree of 
price, product and operational regulation, was a clear candidate for significant change 
(Grenham et al., 2000). The German life insurance market moved from a maximal-
regulation policy, which emphasised insurer solvency, control of insurance rates and 
policy conditions; to a lighter European regulatory approach (Rees and Kessner, 
1998).  The German regulated model created a stable and transparent market for 
consumers, but one coupled with low levels of price competition and limited product 
ranges.   
Regulation was, therefore, viewed as a competitive restraint and a disincentive to 
improve efficiency. However, this could have been a naïve view. Regulation may dull 
competition, but it may not necessarily reduce incentives to be efficient. In the utilities 
incentive regulation occurs in the form of cost-based pricing formulas, under which 
firms can stretch margins by continually improving efficiency, see Hattori et al. 
(2005) and Uri (2002).  Therefore, in the absence of competition, appropriate 
regulation can drive improvements in efficiency. 
The purpose of this paper is to address the impact of insurance market deregulation 
through a comparison of the UK and German markets pre and post deregulation.  By 
comparing the productivity developments of the highly competitive UK market with 
deregulated German market, it is possible to evaluate the beneficial impact of the 
Third Generation Insurance Directive.  
This study adds to the literature by focusing on the life insurance sector; and in so 
doing does not confound the analysis within a combined study of life and non-life, as 
conducted by Mahlberg and Url (2000) and Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006)1.  In a 
further contrast to the previous studies, this paper examines efficiency pre and post 
deregulation and significantly extends the ex-post period to better capture any gains 
from deregulation. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section two, the operational and regulatory 
characteristics of the German and UK life insurance markets are discussed.  Section 
                                                 
1 A detailed overview of the remaining efficiency studies covering the European insurance industry are 
given in the two survey papers by Cummins and Weiss (1999) and Berger and Humphrey (1997). 
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three links industry deregulation to pricing, competitiveness, consolidation, and 
ultimately efficiency.  The choice of variables is discussed in section four.  Section 
five presents the results; and section six offers conclusions and proposes avenues for 
future research.   
2. The German and UK life insurance sectors 
The importance of the European life insurance market is immense.  Representing 37% 
of total world life premiums, the European market leads the US’s world share by 11 
percentage points. While the US is still the single biggest country level market, the 
UK ranks second and Germany fifth, measured by premium volumes (Swiss Re, 
2005).  Between 1999 and 2003, the European life insurance industry showed the 
biggest world-wide insurance industry growth rate and has often outpaced GDP 
growth (Swiss Re, 2001).  An understanding of deregulation and productivity 
developments in the industry is of great interest to academics and policymakers.   
In terms of country differences, UK companies, measured by premiums written are, 
on average, seven times bigger than their German counterparts.  The importance of 
insurance companies’ financial assets also vary, with German companies representing 
39.1% of GDP and UK companies achieving a ratio of 110.1% (GDV, 2003).  
German product distribution is predominately through tied agents, while the UK has 
maintained a significant use of independent agents.  This makes entry into the German 
market more difficult.  Forcing companies to either use expensive independent 
distribution, or enter by acquisition to gain access to distribution.   
In terms of regulation, two distinct regulatory approaches evolved in Europe, the 
Anglo and the Continental approach.  The Anglo approach in the UK and the 
Netherlands has enabled entrepreneurial freedom, leaving product development, price 
setting, and serving overseas markets to the discretion of insurance companies.  In 
contrast, the Continental approach popular in Germany, Italy and Austria, emphasized 
maintaining insurer solvency, control of insurance rates, and policy conditions.  
Supporting this characterization Hogan (1995) in a survey of insurance managers’ 
perception of regulatory intensity found higher levels of perceived regulations in 
Germany; and lower levels in the UK and the Netherlands.   
The aim of the supervisory office in Germany was to achieve complete, clearly 
arranged, and standardized insurance contract terms.  New contracts by one provider 
were discussed by members of the industry and consumer groups before being 
approved.  Insurance firms used very similar policies, which effectively ruled out 
product competition. In the UK, no contract regulations existed.  Germany also 
encountered limited price competition, through the imposition of cost plus pricing 
formulas on the industry.  Regulated prices were typically set at 30% of average 
industry costs; enabling the most inefficient providers to remain in the market.  Even 
efficient firms faced a penalty for good performance, with rules ensuring that 90% of 
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surpluses were distributed to policyholders through terminal bonuses; see Rees and 
Kessner (1998) for further details.   
UK life insurance companies faced none of these restrictions and similarly were 
relatively unrestricted in their investment decisions.  While the investment portfolios 
of UK companies were heavily weighted towards equities, German regulations forced 
companies to hold the majority of their assets in low yielding government and secured 
debt (Swiss Re, 1996).   
UK regulation was most apparent in the provision of sales and investment advice to 
potential consumers, (Ward, 1997). However, following a policy of increased product 
disclosure, the regulator sought to reduce informational asymmetries between the 
insurer and the potential insured; and as such, regulations were designed to make the 
market work more effectively.  In contrast, German regulations focused on the 
maximum commissions paid to agents and the amount of revenue that could be 
allocated to advertising spend, which in both cases reduced effective competition.   
It is clear that the Anglo based system of the UK and the Continental based system of 
Germany engendered differing competitive effects.  Since the Third Insurance 
Directive transmitted a regulatory model similar to that of the UK across Europe, then 
it is envisaged that deregulation had the greatest impact on the level of 
competitiveness and productive development in the German life insurance sector.   
3. Deregulation, competition, and efficiency 
Deregulation was expected to have a number of beneficial consequences.  First was 
the improvement in operating efficiency.  By lowering the level of regulation, 
administrative resources could be reduced, or transferred to output generating 
activities.  The facilitation of cross-border competition was also envisaged to improve 
competition and ultimately operating efficiencies. While the removal of pricing and 
product regulation was anticipated to enhance competitive intensity amongst existing 
domestic insurance companies.   
In terms of previous empirical evidence, Mahlberg and Url (2000) and Cummins and 
Rubio-Misas (2006) indicate that increased domestic competition has been the most 
evident characteristic of deregulation.  Similarly, OECD (2003) provides strong 
evidence that the number of foreign firms operating in the German and UK markets 
remained almost constant. Suggesting that allowing and enabling cross border trade 
are different, see Amel et al. (2004).   
Increased domestic competition can occur through a number of routes.  The removal 
of price regulation can lead to competition based on cost leadership.  Less efficient 
firms must then, either: (i) raise their level of efficiency, (ii) move to a differentiated 
niche, or (iii) exit the sector completely.  In all regards, increased price competition 
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places pressure on firms’ margins, which should lead to a ratcheting up of the 
industry’s efficiency.   
Industry level efficiency can improve if either: i) inefficient firms catch-up with their 
efficient rivals; or ii) the most efficient firms, through technological improvement, 
continue to lead efficiency gains. In the Spanish industry, Cummins and Rubio-Misas 
(2006) found that technological improvements were limited, but the acquisition of 
inefficient firms by efficient rivals resulted in a catch-up effect. While in Germany 
Mahlberg and Url (2000) found little consolidation and little by way of a catch-up 
effect. However, greater development in technological improvements did drive 
efficiency forward.  
It is important to note that the argument that deregulation drives competition, which 
then drives improvements in efficiency maybe a naïve view. In fact the view that 
firms within a highly regulated environment are lax in their pursuit of commercial 
objectives, is not necessarily true. Rate of return regulations cap profits and are 
generally seen to minimize firms’ eagerness to reduce costs. However, regulating 
price can provide firms with incentives. Generally seen in the utility industries, 
incentive regulations are applied by allowing price increases which are lower than the 
rate of inflation. If profits are to rise, firms must be more cost efficient. Regulations 
fixed German prices at 30% of average industry costs. Being the most cost efficient 
producer was a clear way to boost a firm’s profits.  
There is growing empirical support for incentive regulation, with Hattori et al. (2005) 
showing that cost efficiency improved faster in the UK electricity sector under price 
controls, than in Japan with no price regulations. Similarly, Uri (2002) finds some 
evidence in support of incentive regulation and efficiency in the US 
telecommunications market. This study will be able to add to this literature by 
examining whether regulation in Germany stifled competition and efficiency. Or 
actually managed to promote the development of efficiency amongst the leading 
firms.  
The purpose of this study is to provide an improved assessment of the efficiency 
improvements brought about by deregulation2. The approach is to take the UK as a 
benchmark of a deregulated industry and then compare the development of 
productivity with the highly regulated German industry. This is similar to the 
approach used by Boonysasai et al. (2002), which compared the deregulated markets 
of Korea and the Philippines, with the regulated markets of Taiwan and Thailand.     
A particular concern in the extant literature stems from the limited number of years 
under analysis, which centre closely on the initiation of deregulation, see Diacon et al 
                                                 
2 It is recognised that Diacon et al. (2002) provide a cross-country comparison of efficiency in the 
combined life and non-life insurance sectors.  But the study is only an ex-post analysis, focusing 
upon the years, 1996 to 1999; and potentially compounds the analysis by bringing scope economies 
into the analysis through the combined use of life and non-life companies.  
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(2002).  An improved research design would enable a more longitudinal assessment of 
efficiency, where a greater gestation period for efficiency gains to occur is allowed.  
This approach will also enable an assessment of German cost efficiency under the 
regulatory framework.  
An additional concern is that previous studies of insurance market deregulation have 
used the non-parametric data envelopment analysis, DEA, to measure efficiency.  
However, Weill (2004) has shown for the European banking industry that there is a 
significant lack of comparability between parametric and non-parametric techniques 
for measuring efficiency.  This raises a concern that the results of Mahlberg and Url 
(2000) and Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) are highly conditioned on the choice of 
estimation method used.  Therefore, this study checks the rank correlation of the DEA 
approach with the parametric distribution free approach; and in so doing adds to the 
literature on the comparability of alternative efficiency measurement techniques.   
4. Methodology and data 
4.1. Methodology 
Cost efficiency is measured by the estimation of efficient frontiers.  The efficient 
frontier represents the optimal cost level for a given use of inputs in the creation of 
output.  Based upon the sample, the frontier is comprised of benchmark firms with an 
efficiency score of 100%.  The distance of the remaining firms from the frontier 
provides a measure of their inefficiency.  Following Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas’ 
(2000) comparison of the French and Spanish banking sectors, this study estimates 
single country and combined frontiers.  Single country frontiers assume a 
comparability of productive technology within a country and enable a comparison of 
intra country efficiency.  Common frontiers assume a similarity in technology across 
countries and thereby enable a comparison of inter country efficiency.   
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the various parametric and non-
parametric approaches for estimating inefficiency, which are discussed in detail in 
Bauer et al. (1998) and Cummins and Weiss (1999).  Given that both Bauer et al. 
(1998), Cummins and Zi (1998), and Weill (2004) find a high rank correlation 
amongst alternative parametric approaches, the choice of a particular parametric 
comparator to DEA is unlikely to impact the comparability assessment.  This study, 
therefore, utilizes the parametric distribution free approach, DFA, introduced by 
Berger (1993), preferring its lack of an assumed distribution for the efficiency term.  
The average residual for each firm proxies for its measure of efficiency, when it is 
assumed that the random element of the residual averages to zero.  Noting that 
random errors may not perfectly cancel each other out, the residuals are truncated at 
the upper and lower 5% of the distribution.  As in Hardwick (1997) and Ward (2002) 
a translog cost function is employed; and then in order to deal with zero outputs, a 
Box-Cox transformation, as outlined in Khaled et al. (2001), is utilized.   
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The non-parametric approach utilizes data envelopment analysis, DEA, and follows 
the cost specification proposed by Färe et al. (1994) and operationalized within the 
software package DEAP (Coelli, 1996).  In order to understand the determinants of 
the overall cost efficiencies in the German and UK industries, the DEA efficiency 
measures are separated into technical, scale and allocative efficiency.  A variable 
returns to scale (VRS) specification is adopted to avoid efficiency estimates being 
confounded by scale efficiencies. Finally, to facilitate an understanding of the 
dynamic development of efficiency, Malmquist indices were also estimated using 
DEAP.  Based on the assumption that during periods of regulatory changes and 
increases in competition firms are likely to focus on cutting costs, the DEA and 
Malmquist index estimation used in this study are input-oriented. Input-orientation 
addresses how much the input quantities can be proportionally reduced without 
changing the output quantities produced. 
4.2. Data 
The data covers the years 1991 to 2002.  The German data was collected manually 
from the respective annual company accounts.  After eliminating inactive firms and 
firms where data were only available for part of the sample period, thirty-one life 
insurance companies, accounting for 65 percent of total premiums, were included in 
the final sample.  The UK data were drawn from companies’ annual accounts for the 
period 1991-1995; and for the remaining period from EuroThesys, which compiles 
UK insurance company accounts in one database. After eliminating inactive firms and 
firms with incomplete data, the sample comprised 47 firms, representing 76 percent of 
the industry premiums. Since all observations are for firms who have survived the 
entire period, then these maybe the most efficient firms. This could lead to an upward 
bias in the annual measure of efficiency, known as survivorship bias and needs to be 
recognized when interpreting the results.  
In line with the majority of existing studies, such as Cummins et al. (1996), Hardwick 
(1997), Cummins and Zi (1998), Ward (2002), and Cummins and Rubio-Misas 
(2006), this paper adopts the value added approach to identify and measure insurance 
outputs.  Life insurance companies provide two main services to customers, risk-
bearing/risk-pooling services and financial intermediation.  A common means of 
measuring risk-bearing and risk-pooling has been the use of net premiums written.  
However, Doherty (1981) argues, that net premiums are price times output and are 
likely to result in simultaneous equation bias. The price element of premiums is a 
particular concern in this study, where the high degree of German regulation may 
have resulted in higher prices, which would be mistakenly measured as higher output 
and higher efficiency. Incurred benefits to policyholders is an alternative proposed by 
Berger et al. (1997)  However, Diacon et al (2002) question whether management will 
seek to maximize the value of insurance claims.  Furthermore, when compared with 
premiums, claims can suffer from unwanted stochastic variability, adding unwanted 
noise to the model. This study’s preferred measure is net written premiums and 
follows Hardwick (1997), Ward (2002), and Diacon et al. (2002). This also reflects a 
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pragmatic consideration where the German definition of claims changed at the 
inception of deregulation making it difficult to construct a consistent measure of 
claims throughout the sample period. However, in recognizing that the German 
measure of premiums maybe inflated by the average cost-plus pricing regulation, we 
check the robustness of our results by also using claims from 1995-2002.  
The measurement of intermediation services is also contested within the literature.  
Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) use the real value of invested assets, but as a stock 
measure, it is difficult to see how this variable is capable of capturing the flow 
characteristics of value added.  This study follows Yuengert (1993) and utilizes 
additions to reserves, which represent additional accrued benefits to policyholders.  
This accords with the approach of Mahlberg and Url (2000) and closely matches 
investment returns proposed by Diacon et al. (2002).   
Two input measures are included for estimating the frontier functions, namely labor 
and cost of capital, which is in line with the existing literature (Cummins and Weiss, 
1999).  To capture the effects of labor and capital over the twelve years of the study, 
the annual average number of employees per company and total assets minus total 
liabilities, at the end of each financial year, are used.  As in Hardwick (1997) and 
Ward (2002), the price of labor is measured by the average gross weekly earnings of 
workers in the insurance sector.  Measurement of the cost of capital is more 
complicated by the incidence of mutual organizations within the industry.  The cost of 
capital for each year is estimated by utilizing the traditional capital asset pricing 
model3.  All variables were deflated to 1995 prices using GDP deflators for each 
country.  All variables were then converted into US$ for comparative purposes, using 
the exchange rate published by the International Monetary Fund (2003).   
The descriptive statistics for each country are provided in Table 1.  While German 
companies collect greater premium income than UK companies, the opposite is true of 
additions to reserves.  These two results may reflect the differing regulatory 
environment, with German companies investing in less risky, lower yielding assets; 
whilst also being able to charge higher regulated, non-market determined prices for 
insurance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  The cost of capital was estimated by using the CAPM formula (k=rf +ß(rm-rf)).  The risk free rate (rf) 
for each year was approximated by using short term government bonds as published by the 
International Monetary Fund (2003) and the market premium (rm) were measured by a benchmark 
market index.  Beta, the measure of the systematic and non-diversifiable risk, was approximated for 
each year by taking the industry betas published in Kielholz (2000) and own estimations.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Germany UK 
Variable Mean Stdev Max Min Mean Stdev Max Min 
Addition to reserves  
(Mio US $) 
478.2 831.4 7,820.2 0 706.1 1,698.4 20,653.1 0 
Total claims  
(Mio US $) 
754.5 987.9 5793.2 0 405.7 765.1 4539.5 0 
Total premiums   
(Mio US $) 
1,025.1 1,265.8 7,484.2 0 803.2 1,329.7 14,179.2 0 
Shareholders Equity 
(Mio US $) 
1,586.3 2,661.5 18,188.0 33.04 6,232.4 8,532.5 54,293.4 0 
Cost of capital (%) 4.84 1.85 8.28 2.72 6.39 2.01 11.19 3.78 
Number of employees 1,703 2,312 12,423 5 2,884 4,785 33,583 23 
Weekly wage rate US $ 753.34 60.07 873.02 653.90 660.69 46.61 735.05 570.90 
Number companies 31 47 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 provides an assessment of the comparability of the DEA and DFA efficiency 
measures4.  For both countries the mean DEA efficiency score exceeds the DFA 
score.  This is similar to Weill’s (2004) finding for the European banking sector.  But 
one which contrasts with the results of Bauer et al. (1998) for the US banking 
industry, where an intuitive argument is made for higher mean parametric efficiency 
scores on the basis that the inclusion of an error term controls for statistical noise and 
measurement error.  However, Weill (2004) argues that a comparison of the rank 
order of efficiency scores across the two approaches is more important for policy 
decisions, than a consistent ranking of average efficiency scores.  In this regard, the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients for both the UK and Germany are positive and 
statistically significant.  This result strongly contrasts with the European banking 
sector, where Weill (2004) reports statistically insignificant rank correlations.  
Nevertheless, for this study, we have strong evidence in support of comparability 
                                                 
4 The estimated coefficients for the translog cost functions are available from the authors. 
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across the parametric and non-parametric approaches to efficiency measurement; and 
we can feel reasonably confident in the singular use of DEA.   
 
Table 2: Comparability of DEA and DFA cost efficiency 
 UK Germany 
 DEA DFA DEA DFA 
Mean 0.744 0.531 0.574 0.444 
Stdev 0.2993 0.1629 0.3116 0.1930 
Spearman Rank Correlation 0.3354*** 0.4308** 
 
Notes:  
*** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.02 level. 
 
Table 3 presents the various DEA measures of efficiency using net premiums as the 
output measure.  The estimates are calculated from separate frontiers for Germany and 
the UK, enabling an examination of efficiency within each country.  In addition, using 
the pooled sample of German and UK, efficiency is calculated from a joint, global 
frontier, enabling a comparison of efficiency across countries.  To check, in particular, 
that the German efficiency scores are not inflated by German regulation on cost-plus 
pricing, we checked our results using claims during the post regulation period, see 
Figure A1 and Table A1 in the appendix. There is a very strong rank correlation 
between efficiency scores for each firm estimated using premiums and claims. 
German average overall cost efficiency follows a similar path when using claims or 
premiums. Although as expected, claims is more stochastic. In the case of the UK, 
overall cost efficiency from claims and premiums follow similar trends, although 
premiums generates a higher level of efficiency. While recognizing the UK difference 
between claims and premiums, the rank correlations, similar trends and similar 
efficiency scores, at least in the case of German, indicate that the use of premiums 
will generate representative results. 
 
Taking the UK first as the benchmark country, overall cost efficiency declined over 
the period 1991 to 2002, but did show some improvement post 1995.  With an average 
cost efficiency of 65%, the average firm could be expected to reduce its costs by 35%.  
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These results are in line with those of Hardwick (1997), Ward (2002), and the joint 
consideration of life and non-life business by Diacon et al. (2002).  Importantly, the 
UK results are much higher than the 17% cost efficiency in the Spanish industry 
provided by Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) and the 36% provided by Mahlberg 
and Url (2000) for the German industry.  Therefore, despite the decline in UK cost 
efficiency, many firms in the industry appear to be achieving high levels of cost 
efficiency. This arguably reflects the less stringent regulatory regime and the more 
competitive environment.   
The UK excels in allocative efficiency, with a high mean of 86%, indicating that UK 
firms are good at using the correct mix of labor and capital for a given level of output. 
Although, it could also reflect increased outsourcing of activities, which would lower 
the reported number of employees.  In contrast, scale efficiency has been both 
declining and volatile in the UK. This may reflect merger activity. This could be a 
point of concern for policymakers, since competition and consolidation can also lead 
to falling scale efficiency, which is then compounded by market dominance and 
power over pricing.   
Turning to Germany, overall cost efficiency varied very little over the period 1991 to 
2002 and averaged 56%, suggesting that the average firm could reduce their costs by 
44%.  The lack of variation; and, moreover, the lack of improvement in cost 
efficiency is somewhat surprising given the scale of deregulation in Germany.  While 
clearly there was a drop in cost efficiency in 1996, arguably reflecting the industry’s 
adjustment costs to the new regulatory environment, there is no subsequent short, or 
long-term trend growth in cost efficiency above the pre-deregulation levels.  The lack 
of change in efficiency may support the view that price controls were as equally good 
as competition at promoting efficiency. 
The results for technical, allocative and scale efficiencies stay close to their mean 
values throughout the period; and often the higher values for these series occur before 
deregulation in 1995.  Only in the case of technical efficiency is there evidence of a 
positive trend post 1995.  Therefore, the evidence in support of deregulation driving 
improvements in efficiency is limited; and stands in stark contrast to the findings for 
Spain by Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006). However, with only 14% cost efficiency 
in 1991, the Spanish faced ample more opportunity to improve efficiency than the 
Germans.  
Before considering pooled results it is important to note that DEA can be sensitive to 
outliers; and given the different size distributions of the UK and German companies it 
is sensible to check the robustness of the pooled results. This was achieved by re-
estimating the DEA scores with the top and bottom 5% efficient firms removed from 
the sample. Then the rank correlations between the efficiency scores for the truncated 
and full sample were calculated. These are reported in Table A2 in the appendix and 
show a high degree of correlation, indicating that the results are not impacted by 
outliers. 
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From the joint frontier, German cost efficiency is estimated at 56% and the UK’s at 
42%. The German industry is more likely to be defining the global frontier; and is 
therefore the more efficient industry5.  This is a persistent finding throughout the 
period and contrasts with the view that Germany was over-regulated and potentially 
uncompetitive.  The lack of improvement in the German single frontier efficiency 
scores is consistent with the pooled results that Germany was and is a reasonably 
efficient insurance sector when compared with the deregulated UK. This tends to 
support the view that the German industry was able to promote efficiency even in the 
absence of competition, perhaps through price regulation. 
Where the German industry succeeds is in delivering technical and scale efficiency. 
The UK still dominates the German industry in terms of allocative efficiency, perhaps 
reflecting the greater ease with which UK employment law enables companies to 
reassign, or dismiss surplus labor. However, as a cautionary note, if UK companies 
make greater use of outsourcing than German firms, then the average number of 
workers will be lower in UK firms. This would be erroneously picked up as improved 
allocative efficiency.6 
Table 4 presents the Malmquist indices of total factor productivity changes.  For the 
UK, a 4% decline in technical efficiency is partially offset by a 2.2% improvement in 
technological efficiency.  Therefore, while the best practice frontier improved each 
year by 2.2%, a number of firms managed to fall away from the frontier resulting in 
an overall reduction in total factor productivity.  Germany also managed a 2.2% 
technological improvement and with a 0.5% improvement in technical efficiency 
managed to raise total factor productivity.  The size of the technological 
improvements are in line with those found by Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) for 
Spain and lie within the range of productivity gains found in the European banking 
industry by Casu et al. (2004).  Furthermore, as in the banking sector, improvements 
in productivity seem to hinge more on technological improvements, than on catch-up 
effects.  This suggests that industry level productivity gains are driven more by 
leading firms pushing out the frontier each year, as opposed to underperforming firms 
striving to reduce their technical inefficiency.  This again suggests that deregulation 
does little to improve efficiency in the presence of firms who have previously faced 
alternative regulatory incentives to be efficient. 
                                                 
5 Efficiency scores using claims reduced UK efficiency; and not German efficiency. Therefore, the 
dominance of German efficiency is the same whether net premiums or claims are used as the output 
measure. 
 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for making this point. 
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Table 4: Malmquist indices 
UK 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 91/02 
Effch               
    
Mean 0.389 2.317 0.817 1.222 0.354 2.981 0.864 1.019 0.706 1.294 0.837 0.960 
    
Stdev 0.587 1.838 0.486 2.488 0.408 2.116 0.473 0.85 0.766 0.584 0.598 0.751 
    Max 3.594 7.595 2.688 17.735 2.267 10.383 2.694 3.28 4.013 2.851 3.588 17.735 
    Min 0.102 0.084 0.166 0.315 0.149 1 0.261 0.083 0.144 0.306 0.271 0.083 
Techch               
    
Mean 2.924 0.38 0.965 0.984 2.863 0.425 1.163 0.904 1.144 0.792 1.035 1.022 
    
Stdev 1.473 0.256 0.135 0.249 0.967 0.192 0.375 0.316 0.122 0.154 0.363 0.421 
    Max 6.848 1.718 1.313 1.958 4.623 1.215 2.477 1.667 1.461 1.492 2.354 6.848 
    Min 0.885 0.176 0.596 0.737 0.737 0.324 0.691 0.479 0.931 0.627 0.336 0.176 
Tfpch               
    
Mean 1.113 0.880 0.789 1.202 1.014 1.267 1.005 0.922 0.827 1.025 0.866 0.981 
    
Stdev 0.997 0.434 0.409 2.812 0.550 0.956 0.962 0.596 0.854 0.571 0.543 0.677 
    Max 5.613 2.221 2.407 19.597 4.110 4.694 5.481 2.850 5.588 3.355 3.334 19.597 
    Min 0.162 0.018 0.159 0.252 0.389 0.337 0.298 0.061 0.113 0.293 0.100 0.018 
 
Germany 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 91/02 
Effch               
    Mean 1.192 1.029 0.962 0.877 0.984 0.926 0.916 1.129 1.034 1.002 1.040 1.005 
    Stdev 2.516 0.755 0.178 0.166 0.250 0.208 0.372 0.330 0.218 0.149 0.310 0.830 
    Max 15.085 5.058 1.310 1.200 1.913 1.705 2.775 2.783 1.394 1.349 2.198 15.085 
    Min 0.872 0.759 0.596 0.617 0.444 0.554 0.430 0.743 0.552 0.773 0.495 0.430 
Techch               
    Mean 0.989 1.035 1.106 1.255 1.015 1.019 1.091 0.918 0.978 0.928 0.948 1.022 
    Stdev 0.153 0.142 0.181 0.149 0.068 0.066 0.130 0.121 0.298 0.172 0.058 0.177 
    Max 1.507 1.223 1.515 1.595 1.250 1.139 1.320 1.177 1.947 1.232 1.106 1.947 
    Min 0.625 0.705 0.945 1.062 0.883 0.810 0.949 0.684 0.787 0.374 0.811 0.374 
Tfpch               
    Mean 1.178 1.065 1.065 1.100 0.998 0.944 1.000 1.036 1.011 0.929 0.985 1.026 
    Stdev 2.465 0.645 0.245 0.210 0.261 0.215 0.444 0.232 0.354 0.197 0.322 0.813 
    Max 14.798 4.519 1.774 1.914 1.936 1.683 3.340 2.009 2.558 1.232 2.172 14.798 
    Min 0.843 0.574 0.722 0.787 0.431 0.580 0.535 0.508 0.589 0.347 0.468 0.374 
 
Notes:  
effch  = Efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale frontier 
techch = Technological change  
tfpch = Total factor productivity change 
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An explanation for the UK’s under performance in improving technical efficiency 
maybe found in the use of additions to reserves as an output measure.  With UK 
companies being more heavily dependent upon equities for investment returns than 
their German counterparts, then the output of UK firms is more volatile (relative to its 
inputs).  This may explain why the total factor productivity scores for Germany are 
more stable than those for the UK.   
In order to understand the factors that lead to improved levels of efficiency, the 
various measures of efficiency, cost, technical, allocative and scale, were regressed on 
a variety of organizational variables and time dummies.  These broad categories of 
organizational and time variables enable a clearer distinction to be drawn between 
firm level determinants of efficiency and time varying regulatory influences.   
A Tobit specification was used to accommodate the efficiency score lying between 0 
and 1. The second stage analysis of efficiency scores within Tobit models is 
customary within the efficiency literature and out-performs alternative approaches, 
see Hoff (2006). However, a note of caution needs to be heeded when interpreting the 
results. Brocket et al. (2005) argue that CCR type DEA, as used in this paper, may 
generate non-metric efficiency data, which invalidate any additional parametric 
testing of the data. Furthermore, variables used in the second stage which are 
correlated with variables used to estimate the efficiency scores can lead to biased 
coefficients.   
The independent variables and their hypothesized relationship with efficiency are 
detailed in Table 5.  A novel feature of this research is the recognition of differing 
asset classes in the investment portfolio of insurance companies.  The results from the 
regression analysis are presented in Table 67.   
For the UK, only the 1996 time dummy is significant. Providing evidence of an 
immediate, but not a sustained impact on efficiency following deregulation.  In the 
case of Germany, there is evidence of an immediate and sustained reduction in cost 
efficiency following deregulation. This result is echoed in the estimates for allocative 
efficiency. Therefore, the decline in German cost efficiency post 1995 maybe more 
closely linked to employment constraints within German employment law and a 
recessionary economy, than any pressures brought about by deregulation.  
The only consistent firm level factor, across the two samples, is found for 
administrative expenses, which are seen to negatively impact cost and technical 
efficiency. Suggesting that underwriting, enquiring handling and business 
management are a key aspect of efficient performance. 
                                                 
7 Investment costs, debenture and loan holdings are not reported by UK companies and so were 
excluded from the UK model. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for Tobit model of efficiency (continued) 
Germany UK 
Variable Description 
Hypothesized 
relationship 
with 
efficiency 
Mea
n 
Stdev  Max Min 
Mea
n 
Stdev Max Min 
Year 1996 Dummy variable: 1=1996, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Year 1997 Dummy variable: 1=1997, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Year 1998 Dummy variable: 1=1998, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Year 1999 Dummy variable: 1=1999, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Year 2000 Dummy variable: 1=2000, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Year 2001 Dummy variable: 1=2001, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Year 2002 Dummy variable: 1=2002, 0=other 
years 
+ 0.13 0.33 1 0 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Time Dummy variable: 1-8 for each year + 4.50 2.30 8 1 4.50 2.30 8 1 
 
Only in the case of German cost efficiency is there evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that the stock mode of organizational form is associated with improved levels of all 
efficiency measures. The lack of any support for the mode of corporate governance in 
the UK is in accord with Hardwick (1997) and Ward (2002). 
There is no support in the UK results for efficiency improvements stemming from 
asset allocation. In the case of Germany, the increased use of loans, deposits, land, 
and debentures is associated with lower cost and technical efficiency, which may 
reflect the lower yield associated with these types of assets.  There is evidence that 
higher claims are associated with improved cost, technical and allocative efficiency in 
the UK. This is likely to reflect how higher bonus payments on maturity lead to higher 
levels of current business.  
Finally, younger and perhaps more innovative UK life insurers tend to be more 
efficient than their older rivals.   
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Table 6: Tobit regressions of company level efficiency 
Germany  UK  
Variable 
CEFF TEFF AEFF SEFF CEFF TEFF AEFF SEFF 
2.110 1.062 2.048 1.181 0.514 0.435 0.839 1.343 
Constant 
(0.635)*** (0.429)** (0.473)*** (0.253)*** -0.470 -0.450 (0.316)*** (0.262)*** 
0.189 0.073 0.096 0.018 0.004 0.056 -0.022 -0.003 
OrgForm 
(0.082)** -0.054 -0.074 -0.035 -0.068 -0.061 -0.051 -0.039 
-0.534 -0.763 -0.183 -0.273 -0.011 -0.050 0.057 -0.061 
Acq Costs 
-0.522 (0.41575)* -0.466 -0.272 -0.077 -0.075 -0.118 -0.085 
-5.907 -3.833 -1.894 -0.800 -0.828 -0.875 -0.226 0.185 
Admin Costs 
(2.001)*** (1.283)*** -1.355 -0.852 (0.179)*** (0.179)*** -0.147 -0.154 
0.106 -1.294 -3.161 0.897         
Inv Costs 
-3.558 -2.628 -2.590 -1.448         
-0.059 -2.509 0.490 1.487 1.370 0.799 1.081 -0.949 
Land Inv 
-1.782 (1.084)** -1.538 (0.804)* -0.939 -0.914 -0.674 -0.620 
-0.539 1.291 -0.655 -0.554 -2.293 -2.290 -1.617 -1.342 
Aff Inv 
-0.908 (0.522)** -0.800 (0.300)* -1.670 -1.722 -1.256 -0.833 
0.056 -0.320 0.128 0.424 -0.021 -0.012 -0.037 -0.049 
Equity Inv 
-0.380 -0.274 -0.296 (0.186)** -0.149 -0.146 -0.147 -0.094 
-0.021 0.029 -0.535 0.131 0.241 0.277 0.053 0.406 
Bond Inv 
-0.462 -0.399 -0.378 -0.188 -0.157 -0.154 -0.147 (0.131)*** 
-0.216 -0.386 -0.182 0.199         
Deben Inv 
-0.249 (0.22417)* -0.195 -0.123         
-30.437 -20.171 -21.608 1.421         
Loans Inv 
(6.981)*** (4.886)*** (6.487)*** -3.305         
-7.091 -4.473 -6.110 -0.080 0.789 0.962 -0.016 0.615 
Deposits Inv 
(2.058)*** (1.351)*** (1.721)*** -0.918 (0.278)*** -0.330 -0.325 -0.440 
-0.981 0.302 -0.685 0.059 0.176 0.296 -0.011 -0.261 
Solvency Ratio 
(0.550)* -0.303 (0.396)* -0.201 -0.340 -0.358 -0.279 -0.218 
0.031 0.015 0.049 0.004 0.027 -0.102 0.181 0.404 
Debt Ratio 
-0.663 -0.125 -0.185 -0.056 -0.885 -0.887 -0.725 -0.286 
0.036 -0.389 0.046 -0.101 0.010 0.010 0.004 -0.002 
Claims Ratio 
-0.182 (0.123)*** -0.142 -0.076 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)* 
-0.002 0.025 -0.120 0.085 -0.163 -0.250 0.054 0.091 
Location 
-0.274 -0.197 -0.187 -0.072 (0.064)** (0.071)*** -0.054 (0.045)** 
-0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Age 
-0.001 (0.001)** -0.001 0.000 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)* -0.001 
0.023 0.084 -0.022 -0.057 0.003 0.017 -0.002 -0.032 
Size 
-0.033 (0.021)*** -0.027 (0.015)*** -0.019 -0.017 -0.014 (0.011)*** 
-0.070 -0.039 -0.029 0.009 -0.135 -0.162 -0.052 -0.402 
Year 1996 
-0.076 -0.056 -0.074 -0.036 (0.067)** (0.070)** -0.061 (0.066)*** 
-0.131 -0.076 -0.074 -0.058 0.006 -0.027 0.011 0.039 
Year 1997 
-0.081 -0.062 -0.081 -0.042 -0.070 -0.074 -0.065 -0.061 
-0.195 -0.069 -0.121 -0.093 -0.004 -0.019 -0.007 -0.052 
Year 1998 
(0.087)** -0.071 -0.090 (0.043)** -0.074 -0.075 -0.063 -0.060 
-0.255 -0.051 -0.201 -0.043 -0.028 -0.057 -0.071 0.023 
Year 1999 
(0.099)*** -0.077 (0.096)** -0.053 -0.069 -0.078 -0.061 -0.062 
-0.286 -0.067 -0.265 -0.015 -0.102 -0.176 -0.038 -0.057 
Year 2000 
(0.106)*** -0.086 (0.102)*** -0.053 -0.072 (0.073)** -0.063 -0.059 
-0.312 -0.034 -0.302 0.005 -0.040 -0.174 0.108 0.112 
Year 2001 
(0.106)*** -0.092 (0.098)*** -0.053 -0.071 (0.076)** -0.071 (0.063)* 
-0.337 -0.091 -0.270 0.099 -0.096 -0.176 0.034 -0.084 
Year 2002 
(0.113)*** -0.096 (0.109)** -0.061 -0.076 (0.075)** -0.078 -0.067 
Heteroscedasticity -0.003 -0.087 0.160 -0.052 0.104 0.082 0.012 -0.131 
SIZE -0.061 -0.062 (0.058)*** (0.029)* (0.036)*** (0.040)** -0.047 (0.029)*** 
0.317 0.468 0.076 0.215 0.064 0.089 0.214 1.596 
Sigma 
(0.162)* (0.247)* (0.037)** (0.055)*** (0.035)* (0.054)* (0.151)*** (0.703)** 
Pseudo R2    0.427 0.575 0.473 0.509 0.456 0.502 0.481 0.470 
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6. Conclusions 
This study has analyzed the dynamic development of efficiency in the German and 
UK life insurance markets both pre and post deregulation.  By also taking a longer 
post deregulation time period into account, this study improves on existing studies by 
enabling a longer gestation period for deregulation to have an influence on 
competition and efficiency.  In addition, by analyzing the comparability of the 
parametric and non-parametric measures of efficiency, concerns regarding a 
methodological dependent set of results are diminished.   
Under a simple view of competition the highly regulated German industry was 
expected to experience a greater improvement in post deregulation efficiency than the 
under regulated and competitive UK market.  The data does not lend strong support to 
these assumptions.  First, there is a lack of evidence linking deregulation to improving 
efficiency levels, or the development of total factor productivity.  Second, while UK 
intra industry efficiency is higher than Germany; an examination of the German and 
UK global frontier suggests that UK inter industry efficiency is and nearly always has 
been dominated by the Germans.  Therefore, while competition in the UK appears to 
drive more firms towards the frontier, the UK frontier is less efficient than the 
German frontier.   
Moreover, what is clear from an examination of total factor productivity is that 
technical efficiency gains in the UK and Germany have always been dominated by 
technological improvements; and it is this which may explain why Germany is able to 
be more productive than the UK.  Moreover, the dynamic development of insurance 
market efficiency is strongly determined by the most efficient firms.  A result which is 
mirrored in the European banking sector (Casu et al., 2004).     
These findings arguably support the view that price regulations provided German 
firms with the incentive to be on the efficient frontier. Generating a competition to be 
the most efficient. The ability to achieve efficiency gains may have enabled the 
German industry to outperform the deregulated UK market.  
For policymakers the issue is clearly how to enable the frontier firms to improve, not 
how inefficient firms can catch-up. An appropriate policy should assist those leading 
companies in accessing pools of highly skilled labor; and developing deeper and more 
innovative capital markets.  In this way, the supply of high quality inputs as 
instigators and enablers of technological improvements is effectively managed at an 
economy wide level.   
With the weight of evidencing pointing towards technological improvements, future 
research should begin to explore not how fast the efficient frontier develops overtime, 
but what determines technological growth in the insurance industry. This study 
suggests that firms on the frontier and new industry entrants are worthy of further 
investigation in this regard. 
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Appendices 
Figure A1: German and UK cost efficiency estimates by premiums and claims 
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Table A1: Spearman rank coefficients (claims vs. premiums) 
   1995     1999  
 Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .851(**)      te_premium .892(**)     
1996 ae_premium   .944(**)  1999 ae_premium   .948(**)  
 ce_premium    .938(**)  ce_premium    .962(**) 
        
   1996    2000  
 Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .913(**)      te_premium 0.241     
1996 ae_premium   .951(**)  2000 ae_premium   .965(**)  
 ce_premium    .973(**)  ce_premium    .827(**) 
         
   1997    2001  
 Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .789(**)      te_premium .807(**)     
1997 ae_premium   .917(**)  2001 ae_premium   .961(**)  
 ce_premium    .939(**)  ce_premium    .878(**) 
         
   1998    2002  
 Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  Germany te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .886(**)      te_premium .772(**)     
1998 ae_premium   .959(**)  2002 ae_premium   .943(**)  
 ce_premium    .935(**)  ce_premium    .881(**) 
 
   1995     1999  
 UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .781(**)    te_premium .857(**)   
1996 ae_premium  .432(**)  1999 ae_premium  .808(**)  
 ce_premium   .681(**)  ce_premium   .674(**) 
          
   1996     2000  
 UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .832(**)    te_premium .708(**)   
1996 ae_premium  .824(**)  2000 ae_premium  .745(**)  
 ce_premium   .846(**)  ce_premium   .627(**) 
          
   1997     2001  
 UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .852(**)    te_premium .738(**)   
1997 ae_premium  .659(**)  2001 ae_premium  .552(**)  
 ce_premium   .642(**)  ce_premium   .727(**) 
          
   1998     2002  
 UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims  UK te_claims ae_claims ce_claims 
 te_premium .813(**)    te_premium .503(**)   
1998 ae_premium  .843(**)  2002 ae_premium  -0.107  
 ce_premium   .796(**)  ce_premium   0.103 
Notes:  
te = Technical efficiency 
ae = Allocative efficiency  
ce = Cost efficiency 
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A2:  Spearman rank coefficients for pooled German and UK data with and 
without 5% truncation at the upper and lower end. 
   1991     1997  
  te_all ae_all ce_all   te_all ae_all ce_all 
 te_trunc .940(**)    te_trunc .911(**)   
1991 ae_trunc  .872(**)  1997 ae_trunc  .896(**)  
 ce_trunc   .960(**)  ce_trunc   .909(**) 
          
   1992     1998  
  te_all ae_all ce_all   te_all ae_all ce_all 
 te_trunc .921(**)    te_trunc .934(**)   
1992 ae_trunc  .710(**)  1998 ae_trunc  .812(**)  
 ce_trunc   .857(**)  ce_trunc   .952(**) 
          
   1993     1999  
  te_all ae_all ce_all   te_all ae_all ce_all 
 te_trunc .986(**)    te_trunc .990(**)   
1993 ae_trunc  .850(**)  1999 ae_trunc  .823(**)  
 ce_trunc   .944(**)  ce_trunc   .995(**) 
          
   1994     2000  
  te_all ae_all ce_all   te_all ae_all ce_all 
 te_trunc .956(**)    te_trunc .995(**)   
1994 ae_trunc  .843(**)  2000 ae_trunc  .947(**)  
 ce_trunc   .971(**)  ce_trunc   .997(**) 
          
   1995     2001  
  te_all ae_all ce_all   te_all ae_all ce_all 
 te_trunc .985(**)    te_trunc .944(**)   
1995 ae_trunc  .809(**)  2001 ae_trunc  .822(**)  
 ce_trunc   .987(**)  ce_trunc   .945(**) 
          
   1996     2002  
  te_all ae_all ce_all   te_all ae_all ce_all 
 te_trunc .921(**)    te_trunc .986(**)   
1996 ae_trunc  .866(**)  2002 ae_trunc  .875(**)  
 ce_trunc   .946(**)  ce_trunc   .990(**) 
Notes:  
te = Technical efficiency 
ae = Allocative efficiency  
ce = Cost efficiency 
trunc = The pooled dataset truncated at the top and bottom 5%. 
all = The whole pooled dataset , N=78. 
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
